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Notice

UNTIL November 30th editorial communications should be addressed to the Rev. Prof. N. Sykes, 2, Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.

Editorial

WE have become weary of reading, and hesitant about recommending, books that deal with the crisis of civilization and all that. There have been too many of them. They go over the same ground again and again, one pausing longer at this point, another at that point. But everything that can be said seems to have been said *ad nauseam*. True, almost everything yet remains to be *done*. But that is another matter. The human crisis will not be overcome by the writing or the reading of more books.

Thus it was without enthusiasm that we began to read a book entitled *The Christian Future, or the Modern Mind Outrun*, by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (S.C.M. Press, 8s. 6d.), especially as we had some time ago attempted his earlier work, *Out of Revolution*, and given it up in despair of discovering its theme. But we knew enough about the author to make us want to know what he has to say. And we are glad that we persevered. *The Christian Future* is absorbing from page one onwards. The Foreword by Dr Oldham and the author's introductory remarks which precede page one we found needlessly alarming. What follows is not so difficult as readers of the preface may be led to expect, though far be it from us to say that it is easy. Anyhow, it kept us awake and eager in a deck-chair during a heat wave!

It is not a book that can be summarized. The range of its subject-matter is extraordinary. But there are no dreary generalizations. The author fastens upon more or less familiar facts, past and present, and sees them in a new light. The style is racy and brilliant. It has the flavour of William James; how often we have wished that there were more philosophers who could write like that! But Rosenstock-Huessy has a wider range and a deeper insight than William James. He has not the pragmatists' concern with the way things work, but within the context of a profounder metaphysic. His message too is one of hope, but it inspires more confidence because there is no minimizing of what is dark and mysterious and the Cross is at its centre.

Like most crisis books, it is stronger and clearer in diagnosis than in prescription. Yet its object is to lay bare the conditions on which there can be any future at all for mankind. The author himself is in the happy position of knowing what he ought to do and of being able to do it. His message is primarily addressed to the people of the

United States, but we are sure that *mutatis mutandis* it is the kind of message that ought to be addressed to the people of Great Britain.

Above all, this is an example of how theology needs to be written and expressed if it is to make an impact on the contemporary mind. Prof. Rosenstock-Huessy is a lay theologian from whom professional theologians have very much to learn. This is not to say that he is merely amateur or avoids technicalities. Quite the contrary. The sweep and precision of his exposition of the Gospel are amazing. You may agree or disagree with what he says, but you cannot say that it is meaningless or archaic. He hits nail after nail on the head, while we professional theologians are still fumbling for the hammer.

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Men naturally put off radical cures as long as possible. Nations and churches do the same; liberal democratic states most of all. But it seems that Britain has now reached a point at which there is no alternative to a radical cure. We are slowly, too slowly, being to think about the measures that will have to be adopted. Obviously they include harder work all round and a more austere manner of living. This is not at all the kind of national reformation that we have been led to expect and hope for. Will our liberal democratic governments have the courage to tell the people the whole of the bitter truth? "It is a comfortable kind of reforming which consists in throwing off burdens and making life easier," said Kierkegaard. "True reforming always means to make life more difficult, to lay on burdens."[1] If statesmen who believe in the free society, as we are confident our present statesmen do, fail to tell the truth and to convince the nation of its duty, there is no hope of a tolerable survival. No one can be certain how the nation will respond; indeed, the odds may seem to be heavily weighted against a positive response. But at least let us be told before it is too late what are the inescapable conditions of national reformation.

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"In government there are no impossibilities; the most impregnable Jerichos have a way of falling flat before courage and singleness of purpose. Only, he who attacks such a citadel must learn the secret of political courage; that a given course of action is to be judged, not by its own inherent dangers, but by the dangers inherent in any alternative course. The commonest spectacle in history is the cautious politician, visited in the end by all the calamities which he had pleaded in defence of inaction and half-measures."[2]

[1] *Journals*, p. 298. [2] Lord Eustace Percy, *John Knox* (1937), p. 110.

Christianity—Church—Sacrament—I

Our observations on these subjects will not assume the shape of a deeply penetrating speculation in a theologically scientific sense, but will bear testimony to our Old Catholic theological way of thinking, and we shall try to interpret our ideas about what we believe on these points as clearly and as succinctly as possible.

What is the essence of Christian belief?

I always have some objections to this question, especially because one is expected to give a brief and clear-cut answer. I do not consider this right, and am of opinion that the answer can only be given when we are at the same time fully alive to the importance of various fundamental questions. I am not alone in that opinion. A "Wesen des Christentums," a treatise on "the essence of Christianity," is nowadays not so readily written as it was at the beginning of this century. And also the fact that such essays generally came from the side of modern, liberal theology sets one thinking. When old principles and central thoughts are pushed aside, a new conception, a new realization of the essence of Christianity is needed, and then a theologian may possibly succeed in squeezing into a brief definition what to the mind of St Paul still represented "the depths of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge" and "the manifold wisdom of God."

As we know, *Francis of Assisi* based his conception entirely on Matt. x, 9 *f.*: "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses; nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, etc.," and he became a saint, genially ogled by fashionable Christendom. *Tolstoi* pushed off practically with a fragment taken from the Sermon on the Mount: "That ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." It has been tried with the word of Jesus, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart . . . and thy neighbour as thyself," there you have all the law and the prophets; or with the "charity" of I Cor. xiii; or with "the faith which worketh by love" of Gal. v, 6. It is clear that such conceptions may breed paragons of Christendom, but it is equally clear that therewith the essence of Christianity is hardly touched on.

The view of *Harnack* has had most influence. The essence of Christianity, according to him, is "das Erlebnis der einzelnen Seele," that God is Father. For him "the whole Gospel is expressed by the combination: God the Father, Providence, the childship, the infinite worth of the human soul"; "not the Son, but only the Father ought to be found in the Gospel, as it was preached by Jesus." I know that this is not enough for many theologians of the present day, many of them being of opinion that Christology covers a much wider field; but the question remains whether theology, on the strength of its principles and conclusions, has a right to define the essence of Christianity in another and more comprehensive way than Harnack did.

Old Catholicism lies at the root of the ancient Catholic church. I surely need not remind you that the word "catholic" is something

different from "roman," "catholic" being the general term an "roman" the particular.

The fundamental catholic principle is the idea of *tradition—i.e.*, th conscious faith of the Church, which first came out in Holy Writ, an in Holy Writ continuously has found and still finds its bearing Catholic is the faith "quod semper, quod ubique et in omnibus remains the same, that, through the conscious faith of all ages, i unbroken course of church life, takes its source from Holy Scriptur as from the purest possible testimony of faith.

"*To be catholic*" therefore means the denial of any rift or gap betwee Holy Scripture and oldest Christendom, between New Testament an the earliest preaching of the Gospel, between the Gospels and th Epistles, and—to be even more concrete—between Jesus and St Pau And with regard to the contents of Scripture this principle therefo rejects all dogmatic criticism, running counter to the "conscious faith of the ancient church, with which "catholic faith" through all ag and generations feels itself subtly linked up.

Starting from this fundamental notion we might concisely say th the "essence of Christianity" is embedded in the "*revelation of God Christ*"; but even this expression has become common property, an the interpretations of theologians thereof are often widely divergen This wording therefore requires some paraphrasing.

Christianity is the proclamation of God the Father, who has reveale Himself in His eternal Son Jesus Christ; this Jesus Christ is man tru and wholly like us; at the same time, however, truly and wholly Go for He is "the brightness of his glory and the express image of H person." In Him God Himself comes to us, and in Him the shatter link between us and God is restored, restored by God Himself, f "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself." *Atoneme* and *redemption*, therefore; these two ideas are the core of this revelati of God in Christ, and now I am not thinking of any particul theological theory, but I take them in the simple meaning of t Bible, where they are always connected with Christ.

But then we must necessarily go further and connect this unity atonement and redemption with the idea of their *presupposition* a *continuation*.

The *presupposition* of Christ's work of salvation is *sin*, which cut communion with God. It might be objected that not Christ but t Law revealed sin, Christ being the revelation of God's loving wi but I mean by it that the Gospel, by the very fact of revealing t loving will of God in Christ, at the same time revealed sin in the m striking manner. The love of God is not a passive, not a mere pacificatory idea: no, it is active and ready to fight. By showing the necessity of the work of Christ and the eternal majesty of H personality the Gospel virtually taught us to look upon sin as t cause of our fatal estrangement from God. The acknowledgment th sin caused the breach between God and man forms part of the esse of Christianity. And I look upon this acknowledgment as an integ part of the essence of Christianity, because the very conception of changes with every other interpretation of this essence. For,

parable from our notion of sin, is God's position towards evil, the ation between Creator and creature, and, as sequel to all this, rist's entire work of salvation.

The *continuation* of this work of salvation is the "individual salvation" man. I use the word "salvation" to indicate the ultimate aim; th it I therefore point beyond this life on earth, and I do this in der to reject all eudæmonism and not to detach man's final bliss m God. Christianity knows no highest good we can attain by ans of God; no, its highest good is the All-Good Himself. The ence of Christianity demands the belief in a restored relation of nkind to God as the highest aim of human life. And that relation st culminate in a "frui Deo," spreading for man to "all his heart, his strength and all his mind." With the word "salvation" Christi- ty therefore broadens its view in the domain of eschatology, further cussion of which is not the question here.

I speak of the "*individual*" salvation of man, because the Gospel dresses the individual. We are not parts, not particles, not atoms, t members of an organic whole. In God's eye each man represents himself an entity of great value. Every thought of fusion to a body humanity or a soul of humanity deforms the essence of Christianity d pushes it into the direction of philosophical monism or meta- ysical evolutionism, which equally do away with individuality.

And I speak of "*individual salvation*" of man, because this enables us see in perspective the development of God's kingdom and the ceeding revelation of God in the application of the work of Christ the Holy Ghost. This is of such great importance, because from s point Christianity covers the field of the ecclesiology, the soteri- gy and the sacramentology, and that of ethics as well, so that the tire life both of humanity and of the human individual is drawn o the sphere of Christian influence.

Sin—Christ—salvation; or: need of salvation—Redeemer—redemp- n. *This* I consider the essence of Christianity, in the centre of which rist stands as Redeemer and Mediator between God and man, God ing essentially active here and man receptive. The Old Catholic urch embodies these ideas, because it sees in them the purport of revelation of God, testified in the Scriptures and continually rmed and carried on in the conscious faith of the Church. The ter—which is my interpretation of the catholic idea of tradition—I not dispense with because it is the "living" tie, the sinew of life, ich binds me, historical and temporary entity, to the scriptural timony of faith.

At the end of the way of tradition, where I am standing myself, a rd factor is of course needed—*viz.*, the knowledge of my own faith, ich affirms and accepts the testimony of faith handed down by dition. It is not my design to swerve in this way to rationalism; in er words, I do not wish Scripture and tradition to be swayed by ason" in the last resort, but I transfer the total testimony of faith the sphere of personal, subjective faith; here I fully admit the ational moment of religious experience, but at the same time I bear mind that faith is a function of consciousness, just as "reason" is.

I mean to say this: the moment God's revelation, interpreted
Scripture, reaches me along the way of tradition in the faith of
Church and touches my heart, God's wonderful work is taking pl
in me. The "reason" of one may be first and most impressed,
another the sentiment, of a third the will; but the three of them
say: it is not my work, but God's miracle is worked on me. A
whether we here use the word "revelation," or whether we call
"grace," or perhaps "testimonium Spiritus Sancti," is irrelevant
an Old Catholic theologian. Somehow we fight shy of much-u
historical formulas and terms: the idea of "testimonium Spiri
Sancti," for example, has become the heavily laden slogan of a v
special and dangerous kind of subjectivity. ✠ ANDREAS RINKEL,
Archiepiscopus Ultraiectensis

(*To be continued*)

Is the Term "Captivity Epistles" Justified?

THE aim of this paper is to bring forward the idea that all wo
applied by the apostle Paul to express that he is in bonds are not
be understood literally, but are used much more in a metaphori
sense. From the use of those words, especially in four of Paul's epistle
namely, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon—the in
ence has been drawn that at the time of writing Paul was in pris
There is some controversy whether or not Ephesians and Colossi
are the work of the apostle himself, about the time at which th
epistles were written, and also about the place of writing (Ephe
Cæsarea or Rome). There is much conjecture. I do not want to
into details so far. It would take us away too much from our subj
But the following may be mentioned.

According to Juelicher (*Einleitung in das N.T.*, 7th ed., Tuebing
1931), if authentic, both epistles, Ephesians and Colossians, w
written at the same time, together with the letter to Philemon (A.D.
or 63 at Rome).

As far as Ephesians is concerned, Goodspeed (*The Meaning
Ephesians*, Chicago, 1933), with great emphasis, denies the authors
of Paul. He ascribes this epistle to a later collector of the apost
nine genuine letters—as a kind of introduction.

Again, Goodspeed (*An Introduction to the N.T.*, Chicago, 1
pp. 90*ff.*) develops the idea that what we possess in Philippians is
a single letter but a section of Paul's correspondence with Philip
covering two situations: the coming of Epaphroditus with the Phi
pians' gift and the return of Epaphroditus to Philippi after he
been incapacitated by illness. The two letters may have been wri
as much as a year apart. As they now stand the later one precedes
earlier. Goodspeed gives as the place of writing Rome, and as
date about A.D. 59, or 59 and 60 respectively.

Entering on our subject itself, we have to begin by considering three eneral ideas. Only thus shall we get to the right conclusions.

First, the apostle likes to use an exalted and picturesque way of riting—*e.g.*, Col. ii, 9-15, and especially ver. 15: "And having spoiled incipalities and powers, he made a shew of them openly, triumphing er them in it." A very bold metaphor (in order to bring the paradox the crucifixion into the strongest light). I may refer also to Phil. ii, 7: "But even if I would be poured out (as a libation) in addition to e sacrifice and service of your faith . . ." Paul also likes to employ rms connected with battle, such as armour (Eph. vi, 10-16) and fort-sses (2 Cor. x, 4), and all these words are used metaphorically only.

Secondly, the apostle is acquainted not only with Greek philosophy, cluding Greek syncretism (*e.g.*, 1 Cor. i, 20 and 22; also Col. ii, 8). e knows also the Hellenistic mystery cults. This is evident by ie way in which he speaks about baptism (Rom. vi, 3 and 4). The ptized becomes united with Christ in some mysterious way, id so partakes in His death and His resurrection. How far Paul new the Egyptian cult of Isis and Osiris or Serapis is an open uestion, but it is very probable. This mystery cult had spread roughout the countries around the Mediterranean Sea by the second ntury B.C. Under Caligula (A.D. 38) the Egyptian gods received fficial recognition, and they had a temple in Rome. Those who dicated themselves to the service of the goddess Isis took her yoke on them, became her prisoners, *κάτοχοι* (cf. *Die Religion in Geschichte nd Gegenwart*, II Aufl., col. 330).

Thirdly, besides his acquaintance with these mystery-cults, the postle had developed a real mystical piety. Again and again we read "being in Christ" in various forms. I refer to the famous passage Gal. ii, 20, and to Phil. iii, 7-14, especially ver. 10. I mention so another well-known passage, 2 Cor. xii, 1-4, where Paul describes special mystical experience (a rapture into the third heaven and into aradise).

Against this background of the apostle's religious outlook and of his ay of expressing himself we have to examine the words concerning prisonment used by the apostle, and to find out whether they are be understood literally or metaphorically. The list is as given on e following page.

There is no doubt about the words *δοῦλος* and *σύνδουλος*. Paul calls mself frequently *δοῦλος χριστοῦ*, to characterize his service relation to hrist; for instance, in the prologue of Philippians (i, 1), of Romans 1), and also in Gal. i, 10. Paul also gives the honour of being called *ῦλος* to Epaphras, whom he praises as the evangelist and the leader of e Colossian Christians (Col. iv, 12 and 13). The apostle calls certain hristians *σύνδουλοι*. He wants to praise their sincere devotion towards e common Master, Christ, the Risen Lord. He also wants to emphas-e that these persons are his close co-workers. We find that also this rm is given to Epaphras (Col. i, 7) and to Tychicus (Col. iv, 7). gnatius uses the word *σύνδουλος* with the same meaning (*e.g.*, Ep. to e Eph. ii, 1, to the Magn. ii: Migne, *Patrologia Græca*, Tom. v, ols. 645 and 664). In two other epistles (to the Phld. iv, to the

	Ephesians	*Philippians*	*Colossians*	*Philem*
δοῦλος		i, 1	iv, 12 (Epaphras)	
σύνδουλος ..			i, 7 (Epaphras) iv, 7 (Tychicus)	
δέσμιος	iii, 1 iv, 1			1 9
ἐν (τε) ταῖς δεσμοῖς μου ..		i, 7		10: *δι γέννησ τοῖς δεσμοῖ*
τοὺς δεσμούς μου		i, 13		
τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου		i, 14; i, 17		13: *ἐν δεσμοῖ τοῦ ε γελίου*
μνημονεύετέ μου τῶν δεσμῶν			iv, 18	
δι' ὃ καὶ δέδεμαι			iv, 3	
συναιχμάλωτος ..			iv, 10 (Aristarchus)	23 (Epaph
ἐν ἁλύσει ..	vi, 20			

Sm. xii, 2) no special individuals are mentioned, but "the deacc are named in this way (*οἱ σύνδουλοι μου*).[1]

The next group comprises the words *δέσμιος (δεσμός), τὰ δεσμά* (v variations), *συναιχμάλωτος* and the phrase *δι' ὃ καὶ δέδεμαι*. Accordin *Theol. Wörterbuch*, Bd. 2, 1935 (under *δέσμιος*), on all occasions have to assume beyond doubt an actual captivity of Paul. But th linked up with Christ and the gospel; Christ is the cause, and it is His sake that it is endured.[2] Nevertheless, this strong statement is convincing. Let us look first at the salutation. Paul introduces hin in Philemon (likewise ver. 9) as *δέσμιος χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, whereas in E sians and Colossians he uses the phrase *ἀπόστολος χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* (like 2 Cor.). Paul takes his authority for writing his epistles from his c connexion with his Risen Lord. This is the justification for it, the fact of imprisonment. We can recognize still more clearly

[1] In Rev. vi, 11 also, *σύνδουλος* is used in the meaning of fellow-Christian.

[2] R. Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenistischen Mysterien-Religionen*, 3rd ed., 1927, assum these expressions a dependency upon the "mystery" terminology (*κατοχή*). He especially to a passage of Hippolytus (quoted p. 196). He generalizes this pa without justification (footnote 1, p. 196). I do not think that this proced necessary. R. combines real imprisonment with the idea of being a servant (p. But the term *κάτοχοι* in the mystery-cults has only spiritual connotation; it i connected with a punishment imposed by worldly authorities.

The writer of the *δέσμιος* article in *Theol. Wörterbuch* (Kittel) understands that way: that Paul regards his imprisonment as final preparation for the ult "Christus mysterium" of being *σὺν χριστῷ εἶναι* (Phil. i, 23). He rejects interpretation, yet just because Paul in Philippians (ii, 24) and Philemon (22) do regard his detention as leading to the ultimate union with Christ. I am dou whether or not this is R.'s real meaning.

δέσμιος is used metaphorically when we consider the way in which it is used in Eph. iii, 1 and iv, 1.

The apostle does not want to say that he is actually a prisoner. Rather he wants to emphasize that he is apprehended by Christ (Christ living in him, Gal. ii, 20), that he has been made the servant and ambassador of Christ "on behalf of you gentiles" to bring to them the gospel message. In Eph. iv, 1 this emphasis is made stronger by using the preposition *ἐν (δέσμιος ἐν κυρίῳ)* instead of merely the genitive. He admonishes the Ephesians or all the addressees, if it is an encyclical letter, to lead a life worthy of the calling to which they have been called. Paul gives emphasis to this exhortation, explaining solemnly that he has the authority to do so because he is a servant in Christ.

Turning to the phrase *ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου* (with variations), we may begin with Philemon. Onesimus, a fugitive slave of Philemon, has found his way to Paul. The apostle has converted him. This is expressed in the words *ὃν ἐγέννησα ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς*. Paul has succeeded in making him a follower of Christ because he himself (Paul) is a servant of Christ. Paul also declares that he wants to keep Onesimus in his company: *ἵνα . . . μοι διακονῇ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς τοῦ εὐαγγελίου* (in order that he may serve me in the fetters of the gospel). As Onesimus has learned the gospel, the apostle hopes that he will serve him (Paul) as a servant and in the bonds of this gospel. Therefore, here the expression *ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς* is used figuratively. There is also practical evidence. I agree with Erwin R. Goodenough, *Harvard Theol. Review*, XXII, 1929, pp. 181-3, who makes the statement that Paul must have been at liberty at the time of writing this letter. Otherwise he could not have offered "to go bond for Onesimus' peculations, for such a bond while he was a prisoner at either place (Rome or Cæsarea) would have been worthless." Goodenough mentions also the fact that Paul asks Philemon to arrange at once for his accommodation, "a request which would have been an absurdity if written from either Rome or Cæsarea."[1]

Paul's use of the word *συναιχμάλωτος* provides further evidence in favour of the view held in this paper. In Philemon the first in the list of Paul's companions sending greetings is Epaphras. The apostle characterizes him as *ὁ συναιχμάλωτός μου ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. In Colossians it is Aristarchus who is honoured with this epithet, whereas Epaphras is called *δοῦλος χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*. Likewise, in Philemon Aristarchus is named *συνεργός*. Apparently Paul uses *συναιχμάλωτος, συνεργός* and *δοῦλος* as being identical in sense, which implies that the first word has not the meaning of real co-prisoner, but that it is used metaphorically. Paul is permeated with Christ, he is His spiritual prisoner (that means servant). Therefore he calls his close friends and fellow-workers co-prisoners, without any suggestion of actual imprisonment. This same epithet *συναιχμάλωτος* is used only in one other place by Paul—

[1] Also C. H. Dodd takes this request of Paul's as a real point to be discussed (*The Mind of Paul: Change and Development*, 1934, p. 14). However, Dodd in this connexion is interested only in the question whether the place of imprisonment was Ephesus or Rome. With the fact of imprisonment as such he is not concerned here

namely, in Rom. xvi, 7. This occasion can be regarded as anothe support in favour of our theory. There Paul extends greetings t Andronikos and Junias. With regard to their Christian qualificatio he characterizes them as "being of note among the apostles." Accord ing to general opinion the epistle to the Romans was written i Corinth. At the time of writing Paul had not yet suffered any lon imprisonment. Apparently at that time Andronikos and Junias wer not in prison either. In order to take the word literally it would b necessary to assume that these both were in prison, together wit Paul, in one of the imprisonments mentioned in 2 Cor. xi, 23. Bu this explanation seems to be far-fetched and artificial. Paul honou Andronikos and Junias by stating that they are distinguished a apostles. Is it not much more natural to assume that he wants t characterize them as prominent in the service of Christ?

In the epistle to the Colossians Paul uses the word *δεσμά* only once— namely, in the sentence before the last: *μνημονεύετέ μου τῶν δεσμῶ* Remember my bonds (iv, 18). Considering the previous discussio there is no justification for assuming that in this epistle the word *δεσμ* should be taken in the literal sense. In iv, 3 Paul asks the Colossia to continue in prayer that God may open a door unto him for th word (or of utterance) to speak the mystery of Christ for which he also in bonds, *δι' ὃ καὶ δέδεμαι* that he may make it manifest. Take in the literal sense the meaning is difficult. In bonds, that he ma make it manifest? It sounds like a paradox. The use of this phra metaphorically is more adequate. Paul demands of the Colossians t support his missionary zeal with their prayers. They should do fervently as he, Paul, is in bonds—*i.e.*, spiritually apprehended b Christ, to make manifest the mystery of his Master.

In Philippians we find the phrase *ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου* or *τοὺς δεσμούς μ* four times in the first chapter. We have to investigate each one these, the three later ones being more interconnected. Paul begi the epistle by assuring the Philippians that on every occasion he mak his petition for them, thanking God for their co-operation in promoti the gospel. In the first occurrence of the phrase in question (i, "my bonds" and "the defence . . ." are to be taken together. W have to read: "I have you in my heart as being partakers with me grace, both in my bonds and in the defence and establishment of t Gospel . . ." It is not far-fetched to think that Paul uses the wor "my bonds" in a figurative sense. He makes the Philippians to be h co-workers in Christ. With regard to their faithfulness he accords them the honour of sharing his grace. They are also (to a certa extent) in the bonds of Christ.[1] The three other occasions on whi Paul uses the same phrase are to be interpreted likewise. As we lea from Phil. iii, 2, there was a very serious dispute with dangerou adversaries. We are not informed who they were (maybe they we

[1] K. Barth, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, p. 11, takes view of the passage: "In this imprisonment he is, however, active in the pul preaching of the Gospel (or in the *breaks in his imprisonment.* The words could a be meant *generally* in the sense of Acts xxviii, 31)." (The italics are mine.) With interpretation K. Barth comes near to the theme of this paper.

he same Judaizing group as mentioned in the epistle to the Galaians). In Phil. i, 12 Paul reports an improvement in his situation which has resulted in the furtherance of the gospel—*i.e.*, of its proclamation. What kind of progress this is we hear in more detail in he following verses, 13-17. The "bonds" of the apostle have become pparent in Christ in the whole prætorium, but also to all others; hat means generally in the district. People have become aware of he genuineness of Paul's preaching, that he is a true ambassador of Christ. By his success in the proclamation of the gospel they have eceived encouragement, and their boldness in preaching the gospel as been increased. With regard to the improvement of the situation, Paul hopes to send Timothy to the Philippians to minister to them in is stead (Phil. ii, 19-23) as soon as he sees more clearly what his osition would be, and he trusts in the Lord that he will soon be with hem in person (Phil. ii, 24). The improvement in the proclamation f the gospel to the extent which the apostle mentions would scarcely ave been possible if he really were in prison and if a serious trial ere in process. Also in that case Paul probably could not spare imothy, and it is very doubtful whether he would have expressed he conviction[1] (which he based on his trust in the Lord) that he ould come soon in person. If he were in prison and faced by a capital" trial the expectation would have been far too remote.

It remains to consider the expression *ἐν ἁλύσει* (Eph. vi, 20). eading the whole passage more carefully we realize that its content, n its essence, is the same as that of Col. iv, 3 and 4. Therefore, o begin with, we may refer to the explanation of that passage given bove. But there are some further points—namely, two possibilities. Ve can accept either the apostle's authorship of Ephesians or Proessor Goodspeed's theory that it is an encyclical letter. In the first ase we have to realize that this phrase *ἐν ἁλύσει* is used by Paul in is epistle alone. Elsewhere (*i.e.*, Acts xxviii, 20 and 2 Tim. i, 16) aul is not the writer. As to 2 Timothy, there is not only agreement hat this epistle was written in the post-Pauline era, but also that the assage i, 16-18 is very probably a still later insertion (cf. F. J. adcock, *The Pauline Epistles*, p. 141). This fact that here (in Ephesians) he word *ἅλυσις* is used to express imprisonment in contrast to the ords used for this in the other genuine epistles adds some weight to rofessor Goodspeed's theory.

Besides this we have to recognize that *ἐν ἁλύσει* is connected with *πρεσβεύειν*. Paul declares that he is an ambassador for Christ. Taken terally, it would seem difficult to be an envoy if one is in bonds. he ambassador has to be active, to meet and to gather people round him in order to convey to them the gospel message. He needs reedom of action. This consideration would support the view held in his paper.

In the second case—namely, if we accept Professor Goodspeed's

[1] In ii, 19 and 23 Paul uses the word *ἐλπίζω* of the sending of Timothy, but in vr. 24 the word *πέποιθα* ("I am convinced"), expressing his certainty as to his speedy rrival in person.

theory that a later collector of Paul's genuine epistles is the author o Ephesians—every discussion about whether or not Ephesians is a epistle of imprisonment is irrelevant.

This brings our investigation to an end. Owing to the limitation of our sources—especially with regard to the later years of the apostl —we cannot obtain assured results. We can reach only a high degre of probability.

I come to the following conclusions:

(1) All words in the so-called "Captivity Epistles" expressing tha the apostle Paul is in prison are not used literally. Rather the express spiritual imprisonment, total apprehension in the service c Christ. Therefore the term "Captivity Epistles" is not justified.

As Ephesians, Colossians and Philemon were written at the sam time, and in all probability Paul was free when writing his letter t Philemon, we have to assume that it was the same when he wrote t the Ephesians and Colossians.

If the authenticity of one of the epistles in question is denied, c course, any discussion about whether or not Paul wrote this letter i captivity is out of place.

(2) The result obtained by the study of particular words dealin with imprisonment is supported by the fact that Paul uses meta phorical language, that he knows the Egyptian and Hellenist mystery-cults, and is supported also by his Christ-mysticism (being i Christ).

(3) This paper is not concerned with the general question abo where and when St Paul was imprisoned (cf. Acts xvi, 23*ff.* ar 2 Cor. xi, 23, besides the imprisonments at Cæsarea and Rome). Th paper has also not dealt with the problem of development of thoug in the epistles (*cf.* Professor C. H. Dodd, *The Mind of Paul: Chan and Development*).

H. Wedell.

Being and Having

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GABRIEL MARCEL

It is strange that the now rather smudged word "existentialism should have suddenly taken the English literary world by storm duri the last few years, as if it were a new thing. It is, of course, anythi but new. Thus it is strange also to find Mr Rayner Heppenstall, the preface to a brief study of the subject by the Italian philosoph Ruggiero, speaking as if Søren Kierkegaard's name was unknown this country before about 1937. For *The Tragic Sense of Life*, t deeply interesting book by the Spanish Catholic thinker Migu Unamuno, was translated into English in 1921; and that is not o "existentialist" in its general outlook, but also says not a little abo Kierkegaard. And more: the Baron von Hügel included a section Kierkegaard in his *Eternal Life*, published in England in 1912!

But what is still more strange is that this word should have b borne over the Channel upon a wave of Jean-Paul Sartre. For athe existentialism is older than Sartre, as he is the first to admit. And

the meanwhile a Christian existentialism, like that of M. Gabriel Marcel, is hardly heard of over here. Yet Sartre acknowledges that it is a distinctive and respectable position. Moreover, Marcel is one who has come to the Church via his existential philosophy.[1] He was brought up outside all organized religion and gradually worked out a philosophical position which allowed for, indeed claimed a fundamental place for, such concepts as "faith," "engagement," "love," "sympathy," before ever he received the "appel" of grace and (as a result of a letter from François Mauriac) joined the R.C. Church. But before discussing his position it will be necessary to make some general remarks.

I

Professional philosophers in this country have on the whole (and not without some justice) regarded the existentialist fashion with disfavour. The typical attitude of the English logician may be seen in the articles on Sartre by A. J. (now Professor) Ayer in *Horizon* (1945), or on Heidegger by Professor Gilbert Ryle in *Philosophy* (November, 1946) and *Mind* (July, 1929). This disfavour is justified in so far as it is suspicion of an ephemeral fad. But no farther. If, of course, philosophy is to be cooped up within the kind of logical and epistemological inquiries that have tended to monopolize the field in Oxford and Cambridge during the last fifteen years, then no doubt existentialism is even less of a philosophy than the metaphysical constructions of the post-Kantians. Nor can existentialism creep in under the umbrella of "ethics," for by ethics, again, the professionals have been tending to mean the analysis of ethical propositions. On what count, then, can the existentialists, atheist or theist, claim to set up their practice?

The answer depends upon the answer to another question: Is it philosophical or not to philosophize about the meaning of suicide? The answer of the kind of Oxford or Cambridge philosopher mentioned above is bound, I think, to be "No." They will say that it is possible, no doubt, to argue about the ethical implications of suicide—*e.g.*, whether, if it is justifiable on an "egoistic hedonist" point of view, it is also justifiable on a "universalistic teleological hedonist" point of view. Or it is possible to give a psychological analysis of the feeling-state which tends to a suicide-wish; but that is for the psychopathologist, not for the philosopher. Any idea of a "philosophy of suicide" would suggest to them a misty and indeterminate region which the philosopher does well to keep clear of. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are awful portents of acute philosophical minds ruined through early infections caught in such malarial swamps.

Yet the question remains. If philosophy itself does not always succeed in "curing the headaches" that result in the suicide complex, might it not be one task of philosophy to philosophize about its own inadequacy to deal with that situation? And there is a clear distinction between the question, "What are the psycho-physical conditions, or the ethical motives, that predispose to suicide (or to the rejection of

[1] Even his Thomist critic, Marcel de Corte, seems to admit at one point that this may be a valid *route* (*La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel*).

suicide)?" and the question, "What *is* suicide; what precisely doe suicide *do*?" This latter is, I think, the sort of question which th existentialist sees it important to face.

M. Albert Camus, the apologist for a philosophy of "the Absurd," founds everything upon this. Starting from human experience, h discusses the problem that faces man when he suddenly discovers tha he does not know himself. What about those moments, he says, whe you suddenly look into a mirror and discover that it is a stranger face you are looking at? Or when you turn round in bed and in flash understand that the woman lying next to you, whom you though you knew so intimately, you know not at all? Well, in formal philo sophy these questions occur under the nice little separate heading "Knowledge of the self," "Knowledge of other selves." But does nc the context in which the questions occur make all the difference t their asking and to the way in which they will be answered? Is ther not, in fact, something in the contention of M. Camus and M. Sartr that the kind of philosophical questions they are out to discuss, bein questions about human living, can best be discussed in plays, novel and so forth? Did not Plato find something of the same? Only i that setting can the essentially dramatic element in all human que tions be genuinely appreciated. "There is only one genuinely seriou philosophical problem," says M. Camus, "and that is: suicide. T judge that life is, or is not, worth the trouble of being lived—that to reply to the fundamental question of philosophy." Beside tha most philosophical problems posed are at bottom frivolous. "I hav never seen anyone die for the ontological argument."[1] M. Camu own answer to the question is based on his philosophy of "the Absurd, and would not be accepted by the existentialists. But he does, I thin fairly express the sort of approach to philosophy which is common t all these thinkers. "Pathological"? "Après la guerre"? Possibly. Bu even so this kind of thinking is a phenomenon which is part of th total raw material for the philosopher to work on. Why should th logician always think that he can leave it to the psychologist o sociologist to answer the question, "Why *are* men illogical?"? An further: to whom is he going to turn to provide him with the answ to the more fundamental question, "Why *should* men *be* logica anyway?"? No doubt even the rejection of the syllogism must be don through a (suppressed) syllogism; but that still does not explain wh anyone should decide that life is senseless, much less challenge th validity of the decision.

Now it is to be noted that M. Sartre talks of "L'existentialism athée, que je représente." This is highly significant. To be atheist no uncommon thing for philosophers; to be agnostic is still mo common. But to *mention* either, in the description of one's philosophic position, is quite exceptional. A follower of Spinoza might say himself, "I am a monist," or more probably just "I am a spinozist but hardly "I am a pantheist." Some logical positivists are athei in fact; but they would hardly be found speaking of "atheist logic

[1] A. Camus, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe.*

positivism, which I represent." A disciple of Professor G. E. Moore might be induced to say, "I am a realist," but not "agnostic realism which I maintain." Heidegger's atheism is as conscious and explicit as that of Sartre. It is not merely, he says, that the question of God's existence is irrelevant; that even if He exists He is unknowable, by definition; or that, if He is claimed to be knowable by revelation, it is only human experience that can receive the revelation, so that still He remains beyond the limit. It is that the invention of a god is part of the "unauthentic existence" of man (an attempt of man's despair to create a way out of his imprisonment within the limits of human life, human knowledge, human "Angst"); it is that man must be saved from such illegitimate ruses, so that life may be worth living without hope or deceit, for sincerity's sake. It is not enough, says Sartre, to go along with the nineteenth-century radicals and say "God is a useless hypothesis which can be quietly discarded, so long as man's moral principles still remain intact—there are still Values, written in an intelligible sky, though of course God does not exist." On the contrary: "The existentialist thinks that it is very awkward that God does not exist, for with Him disappears all possibility of finding Values in an intelligible sky; there can be no *a priori* good there, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it; it is nowhere written that the good exists, that we must be honest, we must not lie, since we are on a plane where there are only men." (J.-P. Sartre, *l'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*.) This is the meaning of man's freedom: he is delivered from all determinism whether by natural or by divine decree.

The fact is that, quite clearly, to man has now been transferred most of the attributes that once belonged to God. If there were a God, all created things would be distinguished from Him by the fact that their essence preceded their existence. As with an artefact: man thinks a paper-knife (*essence*), then decides to make one (give it *existence*). So with all creatures, God would think their essence, then give them existence. With God, on the other hand, since He is uncreated, His existence would precede His essence (or be identical with it, as the scholastics said). But now we see there is no God. Yet we know of one being whose existence precedes its essence: man. For we *are*, before we think, doubt, recognize what existence or essence or anything else is. It is only later, when we see what a terrifying responsibility this being of ours lands us in, what a dangerous liberty this priority of existence condemns us to, that our courage fails us and we project our situation (as self-determining beings) into the skies and invent an Absolute who can take over the burden of our freedom, who can give us orders, provide us with a *point d'appui* upon which our fragile subjectivity can lean. Thus M. Sartre.

Yet it is to be noted, first that this is not the historical order in which man's metaphysical inquiries have in fact developed. And second (reinforcing the first), that the problem of the existence or not of God is central to the philosophy of Sartre and Heidegger; atheism is not only psychologically, but is even metaphysically, a point of departure for them. That is why, as M. Alphonse de Waelhens has pointed out in his monumental study of Heidegger (*La Philosophie de Martin*

Heidegger), the German philosopher—and the same is true of his French follower—never really gets away from God. Atheist existentialism is as saturated with religious feeling, with the dramatic-mythological outlook upon the world, as the work of any Christian philosopher. To be "atheo-centric" is as visionary as to be theocentric. How different is the bare, flat, uneventful, almost anæsthetized world of the empiricist logician, of the positivist, of the propositional moralist! (I am far from underrating the importance of linguistic analysis in its right place.) That is why the existentialism even of Heidegger and Sartre is so important to the Christian thinker to-day. At least they believe in the vital necessity of asserting man's freedom—distinguishing him above all from less-than-man; not isolating the "rational" element in man from the "decisive" element, but including all in the factor of the existential choice. Even when they object to Christianity the old antinomies that arise from postulating a God (who must either abolish man's freedom by commanding loyalty, or leave man's freedom to him and so become the creator of evil)—even then it is in the interests of man's freedom that they raise the objection, and not as a debating point to dismiss an opponent already disliked on other grounds. It is to the best interest of the Christian to acknowledge the admirable motive behind the objection.

II

It is at this point that we can begin to see why the work of a Christian existentialist like M. Gabriel Marcel is of such significance.[1] He too asserts man's freedom, as distinguished from the externally and objectively determined existence of impersonal things, of "One" (*i.e.*, "the people," "They"—cf. *Das Man* of Heidegger), as well as of subhuman, organic and inorganic entities. In order to illuminate the nature of this distinctive freedom, he takes the borderline case of the concept "body." I cannot, he says, picture to myself a body as living unless I think of it as "the body of . . ." But what is my relation to my body? I like to think that I "have" a body and can "use" it as I please. But that is not entirely true, for, though my will does use my body, it is also dependent on it; my body is not in every sense "disponible" to me. The only body that could be so would be either someone else's body, or alternatively my dead body; but of course my dead body would be hardly "disponible" to me, for I should die along with it.

Here we link up with the theme of suicide mentioned above, though from a very different angle. For I might think that the one way in which I could dispose of my body would be to kill myself—I have the power to do that. No, says Marcel: this power is limited precisely by the "indisponibility" of my body, for the power to commit suicide is only the power to dispose of my body by putting it in a state such that I can no longer dispose of it; in other words, this kind of disposing which we call suicide is not really disposing but putting out of action

[1] I cite throughout his last book, *Être et Avoir*, which is a continuation into his "Christian period" of the *Journal Métaphysique* begun before he became a Christian and also contains other interesting papers.

In other words, my body encroaches upon the sphere of my self; the two spheres are not set absolutely objectively over against each other.

The fact is that the "body-I" relationship is the middle region which stands between, and throws into relief, the disparate conditions of "being" and "having." If I "have" something, that means that I can use it, play about with it, reject it, transform it. Yet even among the inanimate objects which I "have" we can distinguish between relative "disponibilities." The violin-maker *has* something which he shapes, improves or throws away. But the same violin in the hands of the musician is, during the performance of a concerto, an instrumental extension of himself—at that moment he is almost identified with it. "The music carries him away," we say. Then the music is not entirely "disponible" to him. What is true of lesser physical instruments is still more true of my body or of my "life." It makes sense to say "I am my body," or better, "I am my life"; does it make sense to say "I have my body" or "I have my life"? People often do. Indeed, it is easy to identify myself with what I have ("I have a body, I have such and such characteristics, I have a history, I have my being . . ."; this inventory might be claimed to describe me). Yet can I be so identified? There still remains, over and above the sum of what I possess, the "I" who possesses. And at death *I have no more*; yet perhaps that is all that has happened at death—that the *avoir* has gone; may not the *être* remain? Even in this life there exists the phenomenon of self-sacrifice, of martyrdom, to show that *être* can transcend *avoir*. Indeed, *martyrdom* may be set against suicide to illuminate the difference between being and having: both assert a freedom in man; but the one is the sterile freedom which ends up in its own annihilation, the other a freedom which asserts being at the ultimate expense of having.

What is to "have"? "I have a bicycle," or "John has a bicycle." That is clear enough. But "I have my own idea of that." Is that kind of possession the same? And "I have need of . . ." or "I have poor health" is more different still; the absence of the article is significant. (M. Marcel's instances are untranslatable: "avoir mal à la tête"—not "*le* mal à la tête." The French use of "avoir" where the English would say "être"—*e.g.*, "j'*ai* faim" for "I *am* hungry"—draws attention to this borderline where *having* is in a sense *being*.) When I say "I have a secret," I mean that it is interior to me, but also that I could expose it. Thus all "having" has the characteristic of "being exposable." This is even so with ideas, which I can expose to myself, making myself an outside person with whom I discuss them. All "having," even the most inward, is really an external relation; and when I say "I have such and such qualities," it is only because I have observed the same in others. But there comes a point at which the internal can no longer be externalized, even metaphorically; when I can no longer think of my self as if I were talking of some neutral outsider, when I am so much myself that I can no longer talk about "them" and my possession of "them." At this point we reach the existential crux. And here we meet the concept of "fidelity."

I can have no fidelity to an idea, nor to anything which I have.

It is at the level of being, not of having, that such concepts as fidelit response, inner choice, arise. Think of the difference between a "ideologue" and a creative thinker, poet, artist; the former is unco sciously a slave to a dead part of himself; the creative thinker is ev on guard against such a petrifaction or alienation of his thought. the last resort fidelity can only be applied to personal relations—to wife, a friend, to God. A relation of an "I" to a "Thou" (Marc coincides here, independently, with Martin Buber and others). G is above all a "Thou." The God whom atheism denies is "Someo who . . ." But God is not a "Someone who . . ." as though He we one among many whom we could talk about in the accusative case.

Hence arises a paradox: whereas my body or my life are "ind ponible" to me, yet before God *I* cannot be indisponible. On t contrary, charity (agape) is presence before God, the absolute gift self to Him, absolute "disponibility." But the paradox arises fro man's imperfection. In the saint, as in the child, the body does see to be "disponible" to the self, and the whole to God. Indisponibili is in fact a sort of alienation. *E.g.:* I am asked for my sympat towards some poor unfortunate; his sufferings are described to m I want to feel sympathy; I may even work myself up into an *ersa* sympathy—yet I cannot actually feel sympathy. Sympathy is "ind ponible" to me; I cannot order my dispositions; they are to that exte alienated from me. But the saint, or the innocent, seems not to have t inner alienation: they are all of a piece, and all disponible before Go

This gives us an important qualification to the "freedom" whic we said, was so much the basic presupposition of all existentialis For freedom is often made synonymous with "autonomy." But t idea of autonomy is only applicable to the world of *avoir*, not of *êt* I demand autonomy where it is a case of administration—of gooc mental or spiritual: there "I must have my own way." But the art does not "administer" his genius and does not demand "autonom in that sense. The more I enter integrally into an activity, the less it legitimate to say that I am autonomous. The philosopher is l autonomous than the savant, the savant less than the technician. Y the freedom of the artist is not a heteronomy either; any more th love is a mere hetero-centrism. Thus at this point the distinctio between autonomy and heteronomy is transcended, for both imp *avoir*, while the freedom of the subject implies *être*.

Of course, it is hard to describe the central point of *être*, the existe This is inevitable, for the nearer we get to that centre the less it characterizable (all characterization is an externalization, an objec fication). This is true for all existentialists. But thenceforth Marc leaves the atheist existentialists behind. Taking the various indicatio within human experience discussed above (being and having, fideli freedom, love) as pointers towards the absolute Subject, he clai that the existence of God illuminates and explains the hierarchies v have been examining. Yet God can be known only along the *negationis*, since all determinations, attributes, could really only ap to a less-Being. "God can only be given me as absolute Presence, adoration; any idea that I can form of Him can only be an abstr

xpression, an intellectualization of this presence; and that is what I must always remember when I try to manipulate these ideas, otherwise hey end up by being distorted in my sacrilegious hands."

MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

Why You Should Read It—IX

Short and Plain Instruction for the Better Understanding of the Lord's Supper, etc. By Thomas Wilson, Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man. First published in 1734. The 1755 and later editions by the S.P.C.K. abridged. Published with Wilson's other works by Crutwell in 1781 and in the L.A.C.T., with a *Life* by John Keble, 1847-63. A new edition of the tract "reprinted entire" was published by John Henry and James Parker of Oxford in 1858.

KILDARE CATHEDRAL preserves a silver paten presented by Michael Hewetson and Thomas Wilson on St Peter's Day, 1686, when Bishop Moreton consecrated the new cathedral[1] and made Wilson deacon. Wilson[2] had entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1681 with a view to studying physick, but had come under the influence of Hewetson, a Prebendary of St Patrick's and later Archdeacon of Armagh. Before the ordination they "read over together and considered the Canons of both Churches, the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Office of Ordination." Hewetson further urged Wilson to read them over every year and strictly to observe "the laws of Holy Church," the rubrics, the Feasts and fasts and daily offices, together with the "ancient, commendable and devout usages which thousands of good people of our Church practise at this day."[3] The mention of the Irish canons and ceremonial makes it probable that Wilson intended to exercise his ministry in Ireland; but already the Romanist agents of James II were seizing the revenues of the Church, and many bishops, including Moreton of Kildare, took refuge in England. Wilson left Ireland in 1687 to become curate to his uncle, Richard Sherlock, Rector of Winwick, himself a graduate of Trinity, who had spent his early ministry in Ireland. He afterwards acted as domestic chaplain to the Earl of Derby and tutor to his son from 1692 to 1697, when "My Lord Derby even forced me to accept the bishoprick [of Man]."

The Church of Ireland then had the honour of training "the Apostolic Bishop," who derived his missionary enthusiasm as well as his Caroline churchmanship from Hewetson, who succeeded Bray as commissary for Maryland. A lasting impression must also have been made on him by the two great provosts of his time at Trinity, Narcissus Marsh and Robert Huntington. Nor was he unfamiliar with the

[1] A classical edifice built on the ruins of the old choir.

[2] Born at Burton in Cheshire in 1663.

[3] "Never to turn his back upon the Altar in Service time. . . . To stand at the Lessons and Epistle, as well as at the Gospel . . . to turn towards the East when the Gloria Patri and the Creeds are rehearsing, and to make obeisance at coming in and going out of Church, and at going up to and coming down from the Altar." *Life*, by John Keble (L.A.C.T.), I, Pt. I, 22 *seq.*

writings of Ussher, Bramhall, Jeremy Taylor, Ezekiel Hopkins, a other Irish divines. He also refers to the two letters on the guidar of souls published by Henry Dodwell when still a fellow of Trini with the imprimatur of Primate Margetson, who strongly reco mended them to theological students. The common ethos of Trin and the Irish Church may well account for the way in which Wils resembles the good Irish bishops of his day, particularly Peter Brow of Cork, his contemporary at Trinity, Archbishop King of Dub and George Berkeley of Cloyne.[1] Like them he was almost constan resident in his diocese at a time when even the better English bishop Benson, Butler, and Secker—were resident for only three months the year.

Wilson's episcopate of fifty-seven years was marked by his pasto efficiency,[2] his schemes of religious education including the establi ment of parochial libraries, the prominence he gave to the rite confirmation, his careful training of ordination candidates, his supp for the Church's missionary work, and above all by his administrati of the Church's discipline. Of his ten ecclesiastical constitutions wh the Convocation of Man confirmed in 1704, Peter King said t "if the ancient discipline of the Church were lost, it might be fou in all its purity in the See of Man." He faithfully followed the ide set forth in his meditations upon the Sacred Office (in *Sacra Priva* which a century later supplied nine of the *Tracts for the Times.* episcopate would indeed be the best possible argument for sma dioceses if only there were sufficient men of his character to occ the sees.

Bishop Wilson published many tracts of simple instruction, includ *Principles and Duties of Christianity in English and Manx*, the first book be published in Manx, and for the encouragement of missionaries *Essay towards the Instruction of Indians*.[3] But he lives chiefly in his *Sa Privata*, his *Maxims* and the *Short and Plain Instruction of the Lord's Sup* Matthew Arnold praised his writings for their "downright honesty a plain good sense."

The *Short and Plain Instruction*, published in 1734, was "intended the use and benefit of young communicants." The introduction, ten sections, deals with the distorted nature of man and his utter n of redemption; the end and institution of the Lord's Supper; a with the necessary preparation for it.[4] The 1662 rite follows w observations, directions and meditations.

Wilson sets out to convince the young communicants "of the ne sity and blessing of a *Redeemer*" by describing "the occasion of *universal corruption and wickedness* which you see and hear of in

[1] He shared King's zeal for Church discipline, Berkeley's missionary outlook Browne's pastoral efficiency, piety and belief that the Holy Spirit descends on Eucharistic elements for "a Divine and Quickening Energy."

[2] His successor found the natives "orderly, devout and constant in their attend on religious worship; . . . there being no less than six hundred at the Commu in a country parish church at Easter."

[3] Twenty dialogues between a missionary and an Indian. Wilson, like Berk tried unsuccessfully to found a missionary college.

[4] Following the requirements laid down in the Catechism.

world, and which you cannot but in some measure feel in your own nature." "We are all by nature subject to every abomination, and if God, by His grace . . . hath kept us from those great crimes, we must thank Him, and not ourselves."[1] In baptism the Holy Spirit was communicated "for a principle of a new and spiritual life,"[2] but the baptismal covenant has been broken, and so "greater degrees of *grace* and *assistance*" are needed.[3] Left to ourselves without the grace of God, we shall be "separated from Him and miserable for ever." Our salvation depends entirely upon the "worthy *Sacrifice*" of Christ.

The Lord's Supper is "a memorial of our Redemption, and of His love for us"; "the sacrament of reconciliation and friendship with God and man." We cannot approach God "without an interest in Christ . . . but when we go to Him as redeemed by his own Son, and represent to Him, as we do *in this holy Sacrament*, what He hath done and suffered for us, we approach Him as entirely reconciled to us."

Wilson connects the Institution with the Passover, Christ being the "*true Paschal Lamb* . . . who hath delivered us from a much greater bondage than that of Egypt." Elsewhere he expresses the view of Johnson, Brett and Collier that at the Institution Christ "then offered, as a priest, Himself under the symbols of bread and wine, and this is the Sacrifice which His priests still offer."[4]

He next gives a simple account of "the solemn manner" in which the Church keeps up the memory of Christ's Sacrifice. The more illustrative account, also intended for "a young Christian," in *Parochialia* is given here:[5]

First, As God is King of all the earth, we offer unto Him the best things that the earth affords for the life of man, namely, bread and wine, as an acknowledgment that all that we have, whether for the support or comfort of our lives, is owing entirely to His bounty.[6]

The bread and wine being placed upon the altar (by which they are sanctified—that is, set apart for holy uses), we then proceed to give God thanks for His Son our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is the Life of our souls after this manner:

The priest, by doing what Christ did, by prayer and thanksgiving, by breaking the bread and pouring out the wine,[7] obtaineth of God, that these creatures become, after a spiritual manner, the Body and Blood of Christ . . .

For all this is done to represent the death of Jesus Christ . . . not only to

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[1] *Instructions for such as have learned the Church Catechism*, Works, IV, p. 9. He shares Ussher's view of the corruption in the nature of man and of God's free grace and mercy.

[2] Cp. Jeremy Taylor: "The Holy Spirit descends upon us in baptism, to become the principle of a new life," Works (ed. Heber), II, p. 252.

[3] In *Sacra Privata* Wilson follows Taylor in calling "Confirmation the perfection of Baptism. The Holy Ghost descends invisibly . . ."

[4] Note on St Matt. xxvi, 28. Works, VI, p. 423.

[5] Works, VII, pp. 20-21.

[6] Wilson's view of the offertory follows that in Simon Patrick's *Christian Sacrifice*.

[7] The Caroline practice of pouring the wine from the flagon into the chalice at this moment was taken for granted by Ussher, Andrewes, Taylor, Baxter and Patrick. Ussher lays great stress on the sacramental actions of the minister. Wilson is more explicit in *An Instruction for Indians*: "At the same time he breaketh the bread into pieces, and poureth the wine into a cup, to represent to our senses . . . the death of Christ, whose Body was *broken*, and Blood *poured out*, upon the cross." IV, p. 275.

ourselves, but unto God the Father, that as the prayers and alms of Cornelius are said to have "gone up for a memorial before God," so this Service may be an argument with His Divine Majesty to remember His Son's death in heaven, as we do on earth . . .[1]

After this we all receive the bread and wine (being thus made the Body and Blood of Christ), in token of communion with Christ our Head and with all His members . . .

Here indeed are the elements of thanksgiving, commemoration, sacrifice, communion and mystery; but it is the twofold aspect of communion which is most emphasized in the *Short and Plain Instruction.* "We do keep up a continual correspondence with our Lord in heaven; and hold Communion with Him, and with all the members of His Body, which receive nourishment and growth from Him, as branches from the tree in which they are grafted . . ." "Make this Bread a *principle* of immortal life to me, by uniting me to *Thee*, and to Thy *Body*." "We receive this Sacrament to preserve the Unity of the Church . . . as Partakers of one Bread, so of the one Body, which ye Bread Represents, viz. the Body of Christ."[2] Unlike Taylor, Wilson does not actually express the Augustinian view of the Church's self-offering through Christ, though it seems implied in the direction to young communicants at the Prayer of Oblation: "Now join with the Church, and dedicate your whole self . . . unto God."

With the non-jurors Wilson went to the Clementine liturgy in the eighth book of the Apostolical Constitutions for his eucharistic devotions, and he directs the young communicants to *say secretly* after the Prayer of Consecration:[3]

> . . . send down Thy Holy Spirit on this Sacrifice, that He may make this Bread and this Wine the Body and Blood of Thy Christ, that all who partake of them may . . . receive remission of sins . . . may be filled with the Holy Ghost . . . and obtain everlasting life; Thou, O Lord Almighty, being reconciled unto them . . .

Elsewhere Wilson maintains that the elements "do become the Body and Blood of Christ in a spiritual manner, by prayer and the operation of the Holy Ghost,"[4] whose "Power . . . accompanies these elements, and makes them effectual Means of Grace and Salvation."[5] This teaching goes back long before the time of Johnson and the Non-jurors. It may be found in Ussher,[6] in the Scottish Rite of 1637 and Taylor's *Communion Office* of 1658.

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[1] This view is less primitive than that of Taylor and of the Irish Form fo Consecrating Churches (1666), where the earthly rite is "in imitation of Christ' Eternal Priesthood," "Who . . . upon the heavenly Altar perpetually presents t Thee the Eternal Sacrifice."

[2] Works, V, p. 531.

[3] This invocation appears in the 1781 collection of Wilson's works by Crutwell but is absent in the editions by the S.P.C.K. In *Sacra Privata* Wilson gives anothe version, beginning: "We offer unto Thee, our King and our God, this bread an this cup" (V, p. 74).

[4] Works, IV, p. 120.

[5] Works, V, p. 339.

[6] Ussher, Works, ed. Elrington, II, pp. 426 *seq.* In the *Whole Body of Divinity* wrongly attributed to Ussher, but said to express his teaching, our Lord at th

Although *Sacra Privata* contains a prayer for the restoration of "the First Service of Edward VI, or such as shall be more conformable to the appointment of Christ and His Apostles, and their successors,"[1] Wilson's pastoral sense led him to interpret for young communicants the 1662 rite in the best Caroline tradition. In the first Our Father "we beg of God the Bread which must nourish us unto Life Eternal"; the Commandments will convince us of "the NEED and NECESSITY of a REDEEMER"; we pray for kings first of all; we exercise our faith in the Creed, and our charity by giving alms and more extensively by praying for the whole Church of Christ; we "will not easily fall into a state of *sin* and *security*,"[2] if we hear the exhortations; "Now [after Communion] being made *one with Christ, and Christ with us*, we have full liberty to apply to God as our heavenly *Father*" in the second Lord's Prayer; and in the Gloria in Excelsis we follow "the example of our *blessed Lord*, who when He had instituted and ordained this Sacrament, sung an hymn; so do we praise God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, for our Redemption." "The Lord's Supper is an occasion of exercising all our Christian graces."[3]

Keble follows the original text in Crutwell's edition of Wilson's Works of 1781,[4] but gives footnotes showing the result of a collation with the eleventh edition of the Tract by the S.P.C.K. in 1755, the year of Wilson's death. The bishop's son, Thomas, had seen the tract through the press, and had not only advised but made minor alterations. After his father's death he freely struck out what seemed to him not to be "upon a Catholic plan . . . to unite all Protestants"; and thus in the *Sacra Privata* for Monday nearly two whole manuscript pages on confirmation are struck out, with a marginal note: "All this is very objectionable. . . . Confirmation was not practised before the second century."[5] It is therefore not surprising that the omissions in the eleventh edition include all prayers referring to confirmation, or "the holy Altar," and the invocation from the Clementine liturgy. Without access to the first ten editions by the S.P.C.K., I cannot say whether the bishop's death was made the occasion of these omissions, or whether Keble had no earlier edition before him when he made the collation of the entire text with the abridged edition of 1755. Keble, however, hints that these devotions "were absent from the copy which by the Bishop's consent was transmitted for publication to England in 1733, and reproduced all along by the Society in its reprints."[6] In its abridged form the *Short and Plain Instruction* became widely known and had much influence in evangelical circles for more

Institution prayed "that his death, in itself sufficient to save, might by the working of the Holy Spirit, be effectual to the elect: and that those outward signs of Bread and Wine might, through the operation of his Holy Spirit, be effectual to the purposes they were ordained unto . . ."

[1] Works, V, p. 73.

[2] "*Security*. There is nothing more Dangerous than to think ourselves Holy enough . . ." Maxim 637, Works, V, p. 449. "The oftener you look into the state of your soul . . . the less danger you will be in of falling into a state of sin and security, which hath been the ruin of an infinite number of souls."

[3] Works, V, p. 531. [4] Works, IV, pp. 339 *seq.* [5] *Life*, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 918.

[6] *Life*, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 757.

than a century. In the nineteenth century the S.P.C.K. continued to publish the abridged form, but in 1858 John Henry and James Parker published "a new Edition, reprinted entire."

Although Wilson, in his *Memoranda*,[1] refers to Johnson's "*Unbloody Sacrifice*," he must have had a deeply rooted eucharistic belief before the age of fifty-one, when that work first appeared. We have noticed resemblances to the older teaching of Ussher, Patrick and Taylor. At the age of seventy-one he published the *Short and Plain Instruction*, which as a simple instruction for young communicants has never been surpassed. It reveals a Catholic view of the Eucharist, rooted in Scripture, with an evangelical emphasis on "the necessity and blessing of a *Redeemer*."[2] This little manual is easy to come by; but much profit may also be gained by reading *Sacra Privata*, the *Maxims*, the *Instruction to Indians*, and above all his *Life*, which John Keble thought it worth while to take sixteen years in writing. F. R. Bolton.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

We publish with pleasure the first part of a lecture that was delivered in Oxford by the Old Catholic Archbishop of Utrecht during his recent visit to England. The remainder of the lecture will follow in two parts.

Dr Wedell is Warden of Oakenrough, Haslemere.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE ARCHBISHOP AND REUNION

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

"The Œcumenical Movement," writes Mr Jenkins, "is, in point of fact, a minority movement in all the churches." It is less than that; it is largely specialist and, for all its discussions of the contemporary scene, somewhat academic. This, in view of its origins, was probably inevitable, for it was born of the S.C.M. rather than of the congregation. All honour to its parents. But now the time has come for the conversation to be promoted in circles where, to tell the truth, the very word œcumenical will be liable to sound outlandish. Presbyterian Tom, Anglican Dick and Baptist Harry must be brought to meet one another. It is unjust to infer unwillingness from their

[1] Contained in his interleaved copy of *Plain and Short Directions and Prayers*. Works, IV, p. 119.

[2] My interest in this book was recently revived by the references to it in M. A. C. Warren's *Strange Victory*.

present apathy, since they have up to now been given no real opportunity of joining in. One fears that they have not seemed to matter very much. But neither the World Council of Churches nor the British Council of Churches is likely to bear much further fruit till it has struck some roots into the churches. That which has happened on a large scale at Edinburgh, Oxford, Tambaram, must, unless it is to prove abortive, happen on a local scale in towns and countrysides.

Now this is not to say that every locality should be provided with an organization called a Christian Council. Probably it had better not. Nor should the coming together be confined to co-operation in "frontier" work, which, necessary though it is in itself, promotes very little in the way of deeper understanding. Rather it is the "hinterlands" of the various churches, the faithful nuclei, which must themselves be brought to meet, and that specifically that they may learn of one another's faith and practice. The group which meets in the vicar's study will invite the group which meets in the Methodist minister's study to come and tell it about Methodism, and *vice versa*. This is altogether to be preferred to the vicar holding forth to the Methodists and the Methodist minister to the Anglicans. It is the convinced rank and file who must be brought into the interchange, and in the first instance meetings of church with church are likely to make for more intelligible communication than a general gathering of representatives of many churches. The latter is in any case almost certain to be initiated by consisting exclusively of church officials.

Experience of such gatherings as are here recommended goes to show that they can be at once robust and charitable, that (as a by-product) those who take part in them learn a lot about their own traditions and that things are still revealed to babes which are hidden from the wise and prudent. There is a danger lest the forthcoming meeting of the World Council of Churches should conduct a private conversation—private, however much it may be publicized—because it is out of contact with the consensus of the Church and is too rarefied. Indeed, its first work might well be to recommend itself to the general body of Christian people dispersed throughout the world, most of whom still know nothing of it, and to urge them to become known to one another in their neighbourhoods, not merely fraternally but ecclesiastically. Then let the British Council of Churches devote itself to the promotion of these mutual self-explanations in humble places, or, till that is done, Hampton Court and the Savoy are likely merely to repeat themselves.

Yours, etc.,
FRANK BENNETT.

WIGAN.
July 25, 1947.

THE PAROCHIAL SYSTEM

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In August the Rev. C. K. K. Prosser outlined a beautiful scheme for turning the clergy of the Deanery of Leigh into commandos of the Anglican Church. His scheme contains certain valuable suggestions

(though only for the priesthood)—namely, a variety of churches in which to serve, opportunities for central prayer, study and planning. Yet whatever may be its value for urban areas, the scheme does not meet the case of rural England. The weakness of the Church of England is that it seems to regard priests as the only persons qualified to address and serve the Almighty.

The collapse prophesied for our towns has already happened in many country parishes, with sad results. Ecclesiastical taxation is rising, and church services are being cut down, with the result that collections are smaller and fabric repairs are a growing burden. Thus the philanthropic and evangelistic work which is the test of the Church's worth is almost at a standstill. Country parishes are pathetically fighting for financial survival by means of the abysmal paraphernalia of raffles, baby shows and rummage sales. All this is the outcome of the policy which Mr Prosser plans for the Deanery of Leigh. The staggering of services to suit the convenience of flying priests, and the patching up of the holes with the services of those loyal but much-neglected lay readers, have already been tried in the country. The results are twofold: first, that where there are no Church of England services our people go to Nonconformist chapels, which manage to minister once and often twice a Sunday to the loneliest flocks without a priesthood and without endowments; secondly, that our Church is giving less and less of its money and service to missionary and philanthropic works.

We must ask ourselves, before we start planning, what the Church machinery, the ministry and its endowments, was and is intended to achieve.

(i) *What is the ministry intended to achieve?* It is surely the purpose of the ministry to see that even the loneliest and smallest congregation of Christians are shepherded and cared for with the same love that Christ bestows upon the two or three who may be gathered together in His name. The ministry proves its validity when it demonstrates to even the smallest flocks Christ's concern for each one of them. It is intended to be a proof of His presence. Where there exist to-day churches without bishops or priests, their origin may nearly always be traced to the failure of bishops in the past to care for Christians separated from their fellows by social, political or economic quarrels. Their dissent is more economic or political than religious in origin. It may even be argued that the lay ministry of Nonconformist churches which cares for people in lonely places untouched by our Church is essential to and part of the development of the historic orders of the Church. And both are gravely weakened in separation. Have not churches failed their people when they have failed to make use of divers orders of ministry in their economy?

Against this background of the duty of the ministry it is necessary to set the financial plight of the Church of England, with its shortage of priests. To starve small country congregations just because of the shortage of priests and money is a dereliction of duty to Christ and His people.

(ii) *The diversity of ministry.* Apart from its origin the Church

possesses a God-given gift from which it cannot be disendowed—namely, the call which year by year God gives to hundreds of men and women to serve in His Church. For the present let us ignore the question of the ministry of women and focus the attention on a particular event. During the war several thousand men in the forces said that they felt a call to holy orders. Of those it is said that a considerable proportion has been rejected as unsuitable for the priesthood. But were all these men unsuited to serve in some lesser ministerial capacity, regularly employed by the Church and paid accordingly, even on a part-time basis? It occasionally happens that men are ordained to the priesthood for lack of any other regular ministerial status to which they were better suited, and some are refused the priesthood for the same reason. Are the vocations of these men being sufficiently used in the Church? They have varying gifts; let them be appointed to an appropriate ministry and encouraged to use their talents with the same fidelity that Christ enjoined in the parable. If we called forth these talents, there would be no shortage of ministers in our Church.

(iii) *The purpose of endowments.* In the Church of England we possess parochial endowments of great antiquity, and many of them were expressly designed for the priesthood. But many of them were not, and at first paid for the services of a deacon, reader or master. It would be a mistake to say that parochial endowments as a whole were designed for one particular order of ministers, for many even of our pre-Reformation churches had their origin in schools and communities. They were rather the gift of pious people to provide, according to their financial ability, for the services of some minister in their midst. They represent the desire of the faithful to support their minister according to his status and responsibility. The endowments of our Church place on an impartial and respectable footing what the Nonconformists do for their ministers and preachers when with some embarrassment they ask them what are their expenses of maintenance and travel. I believe ours is the better system. But their primary purpose is to meet the needs of a local man, whatever his status might be. Therefore I hold that the union of benefices is wrong on two counts. First, because it assumes that the priesthood is the only order competent to exercise a regular local ministry; and second, because it assumes that parochial endowments were always priestly in intention. Many were not. The financial juggling with parish stipends which is going on to-day ignores one very important fact—that the money was given by local people for a local man. There would be less objection to the removal of a resident priest from some parishes, and to the pooling of endowments, if some minister (whether deacon, reader, or perhaps deaconess) were licensed to a particular parish to exercise a part-time ministry and to be paid a stipend according to his or her status in the ministry. On several benefices sufficient money would be saved to increase the salary of priests.

Not until we care for the small numbers of Christians in our charge shall we as a Church be qualified to serve the thousands over whom we have nominal jurisdiction.

J. Breay.
48 Greenside, Kendal.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CLAIMS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By Cyril Garbett, Arch bishop of York. Hodder and Stoughton. 15s.

THE ANGLICAN TRADITION IN THE LIFE OF ENGLAND. By A. T. H Williams, Bishop of Durham. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

The Church of England is under God the fruit of a particula history. That is, of course, true of every part of the Church. "Eccles astical order," wrote Dr Fairbairn, "will ever reflect the civil poli prevailing in the region where it is evolved"; and not only does ord reflect polity—temper reflects temperament. But it is peculiarly th case with the Church of England that it has been moulded by th successive courses of national habit and opinion. No one man genius has dominated it, nor even a series of outstanding figures. Th loyalties and aversions of large and various sections of a people (f it has never been able to claim them all) have gone to make it wh it is. Certainly there have been outstanding figures, some of the singularly unprepossessing. Scripture itself continually reminds that the Lord of history is not so nice in His choices as human respec ability might wish, and the next upheaval may well confound th edifying policies by finding its occasion in some strange quarte Looking back, Thomas Cromwell and Dr Sacheverell have to be s side by side with Ken and Simeon. This Machiavellian Cromwell a partisan Sacheverell were, like Jacob, types of their times, and it is t part played by such types of the times that gives to the history of t Church of England its biblical flavour. Samson is less pleasing th the Second Isaiah, yet he is there. Thus in seeking to fathom t Church of England one may well go on pilgrimage to Bemerton Little Gidding, but one must also attend in imagination at the hustin of bygone elections. One will pray with Bishop Andrewes, but a haunt the family pews of squires and meetings of Victorian eccles logists. In short, the Church of England is a place where one mu believe strongly in the providence of God.

This faith is implicit in two books which have recently come from t pens of the episcopate. Neither produces a theory of Anglicanism, a indeed we have been reminded in the pages of THEOLOGY that t particular "ism" has only lately become self-conscious. Both a unembarrassed in their allegiance to the apostolic Church as reform in this realm. The development of this Church (if development not too continuous a word to use of so episodal a story) is traced by t Bishop of Durham with an effective candour. He has no axe to grin the tools are in the hand of God. But here is a piece of first-rate h torical writing. Indeed it would be hard to speak too highly of t first eight chapters of this book. The last two become perhaps t much of a catalogue and deal with times so recent that no man livi can form broad judgments about them. One suspects that there ha been submerged happenings of more lasting significance than many those recorded here. But the journey from Cranmer to Tait is scribed with masterly discrimination; specialist strands of rec

istorical research and appraisal are woven into a vivid tapestry; onesty is never sacrificed to pattern nor reinterpretation run to eath. Those who were brought up on Wakeman (and some of his implifications of a far from simple story are still in currency) will find onveniently garnered here a number of inconvenient truths. The nedieval Church was not Anglo-Catholic nor the English Reformation n ecclesiastical revolt. Between the Carolines and the Tractarians vas not one great wilderness. The eighteenth century and the Evangel- al Revival receive fair play. But also the story is given the setting of hich the title of the book gives promise. The Laud who had a social leal is not lost in the Laud who railed in altars. The profound and ill not inoperative effects of religious motive and alignment in the rth of the English party system are duly noted in this unchurchy hurch history. Perhaps the only criticism that might be offered of its ntents is that they require for their digestion some prior knowledge of e grammar of the subject. But how should one write even popularly n such a subject without making this requirement?

Not that the book is in the least abstruse. Its conciseness is matched an admirable clarity. There are sentences which say as much as is id by many present-day books in a host of their repetitive paragraphs, nd say it better. For Tacitus has few stylistic disciples to-day, least f all among theologians and ecclesiastics. There is pleasure in a raftsmanship which makes its points pithily, and the Bishop of Durham such a craftsman. So the portrait of Laud is perfectly drawn with a ngle sweep of the pen—"Laud's unwisdom was almost as rare as his ourage"; and of Butler—"he has trained generations of English- nen to understand the art of reasoning on the greatest of all subjects." uch literary grace commends its subject, but the Church of England is laced upon a firmer foundation. We see it as a living temple and are ore fully persuaded by history than by an ingenious apologetic that the Lord is in the midst of her."

The Archbishop of York takes up the story. His book speaks of the orkaday Church of England as it is, and it was high time that it was poken for. Those are here its claims, that it is as it is and that, for all s blemishes, it will bear looking at. One may thank God that He as placed one in a modest Church, but also champion that modest hurch against those who despise its modesty. So on the one hand here is in this book no taint of boastfulness and on the other the quiet onviction of a son who has served this mother long and found her rustworthy. Perhaps the charming account of another mother in the ntroduction sets the tone. But the book is nothing if not practical. Ve are conducted through the present-day Church of England with a unning commentary. Portsea of yore is affectionately glanced at, but here is frank recognition that Portsea of yore is neither Portsea nor nywhere else of to-day. The esteem and lack of esteem with which espectively the Bishop and "the Bishops" are apt to be regarded are hrewdly contrasted. Nobody except James II ever managed to make "the Bishops" popular. Indeed, it is an engaging combination of kindliness nd shrewdness that gives distinction to this straightforward account of he Church of England—that and a most pleasant simplicity of style.

Yet one will look for something more in a book about the Church written in such times as these by one of its Archbishops. At first there is disappointment. "No thoughtful churchman," we read, "will deny the existence of anomalies and defects which should be dealt with as soon as possible." Some thoughtful churchmen will greet that mild remark with a sigh. But the sigh will be forgotten when the closing chapters are reached. These are far more exciting than the chapter on "The Church and State" which has apparently provoked the most excitement. Church and State, if for no better reason than lack of parliamentary time, will probably rub along together for some years to come, and what new factors may appear in the meanwhile who shall say? The revived interest in Christian political theory may yet bear fruit in something more invigorating than a mere *modus vivendi*. But there are other problems which press more immediately upon the Church affected not only by the decay of faith but by the transformation of so much of its former status into fiction. Those upon whom these problems press in terms of urgent practical decisions to be made will find that this pressure is understood and shared at Bishopthorpe. They will find too that they themselves, the plodding clergy and laity, are not despised, as it has been altogether too fashionable to despise them in quarters where high policy is talked. But most of all they will be encouraged by such words as these: "It is never easy to admit unpleasant facts—but facts are facts and things are what they are, and it is both useless and dishonest to attempt to deny them." And again: "Shock tactics, widespread advertisements, a nation-wide campaign, are unlikely to result in genuine conversion." The good quiet humble things that are going on can find shelter here from the impatience of enthusiasts.

Frenzy has never been characteristic of the Church of England. From time to time some body of official or unofficial engineers seeks to "rev it up." From time to time partisanship works itself up into a state of fury and this is apt to be more conspicuous than the great body of despised moderation. But, in point of fact, the Church of England which worships in the parish churches of a Sunday is almost wholly unaware of the various organs and persons that constitute themselves its peculiar champions. Moreover, the private armies that did battle within the Church seem to have reached their zenith in the early decades of the century. On fewer and fewer of us can the Whips rely. This is a change which hardly receives from either of these books the attention that it deserves, nor do they remark the effects of the resurrection of biblical theology, which has in part brought this change about. Yet together they provide an account of the Church of England which is admirably free from special pleading and rigid theorizing but also shows it for what it is—a Church that both nourishes convictions and is perhaps the least doctrinaire body in the world. For its virtue does not, as some seem to suggest, wholly consist in that, at a time of more drastic change elsewhere, it maintained some essential minimum of tradition. It has brought forth, not indeed a system (for that we may be thankful), but precious and distinctive fruit of Him who is the true Vine.

Frank Bennett.
Wigan.

THE EPISTLE OF ST PAUL TO THE PHILIPPIANS. By H. G. G. Herklots. Lutterworth Commentaries. 5s.

A PARAPHRASE OF ST PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS. By S. C. Carpenter. S.P.C.K. 1s.

The announcement of a new series of commentaries causes a flutter of excitement in the breasts of those who are engaged in teaching the Bible to students on the middle and lower levels. For, truth to tell, with a few brilliant exceptions, our present commentaries are almost useless for this purpose. When they are not so occupied with prolegomena as to finish just where one hopes they will begin, their notes are so disjointed and their lay-out so unattractive as to be unreadable except by the expert. The student who goes to them for the understanding of an important biblical idea will almost certainly come away disappointed, and, what is more regrettable, the clergy hardly expect any longer to receive help from that quarter in the preparation of their sermons. The most fruitful and compelling exegesis, based upon, and arising out of, the previous critical analysis, has somehow failed to make its way into the commentaries, but is rather to be found scattered about in such books as Professor W. Manson's *Jesus the Messiah*, Dr Vincent Taylor's trilogy on the Atonement, Fr Thornton's *The Common Life in the Body of Christ*, and even Schweitzer's *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. The ideal commentator who combines first-rate scholarship with sustained theological understanding and the ability to write in such a way that human life is penetrated and illuminated by his exegesis of the text is no doubt a *rara avis*; yet commentaries, in some form or other, there must be, and those who project new commentaries ought to give very careful thought both to questions of the format and the language in which they are to be written and to the scope and purpose of the exposition.

Mr Herklots' book is advertised as a "devotional commentary," a phrase which is not explained, and as the first of a series "designed to meet the needs of the ordinary Bible-reader, who has no specialized knowledge and who is anxious above all to discover a message and meaning for life in the world to-day." Like Dr Carpenter's paraphrase, indeed like most English works of this kind, it has an admirable introduction, and it is competently written in a lively style; but what one misses is a steady concentration upon the text of the epistle and the confident assumption that the reader, however ordinary, is best served in being lifted to St Paul's level and made to see his modern problems restated and answered there. "What we are to read is not a studied, literary production . . . but a genuine letter." True and most important, and the author brings this out with many happy turns of phrase; but what does not appear so clearly from his commentary is what it is that made St Paul write such letters as had never been written before and as have not been written since. The description of Paul at Philippi and of the occasion and place of writing is excellent, but the exposition of the words "that I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings, being conformed unto his death; if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead" is

bare and inadequate in comparison. Yet is it not the meaning of such words as these that the reader needs to know if he is to discover the message and meaning for life in the world to-day, and is it not the principal function of a commentary to unfold the meaning for him? If the book is really for the ordinary reader it seems a pity to disfigure so many pages with footnotes referring to theological works, ephemeral and otherwise, which are hardly likely to come his way, and it is, to say the least, a waste of space in half a page of comment on the word "grace" to quote the judgment of the Second World Conference on Faith and Order that "there is in connection with this subject no ground for maintaining division between Churches" and then to add a footnote to inform us that the Rev. Daniel T. Jenkins dissents from this view in his book *The Nature of Catholicity*. Would it not be better to take a good look at the ordinary reader, and then to relegate him to the back of one's mind and get on with the work of letting the text of the epistle speak for itself?

It is this which Dr Carpenter attempts to do in his paraphrase, and it is so well done that it is not surprising that there was such a demand for the publication of what was first spoken over the air in the "Lift up your hearts" program. Dr Carpenter makes bold claims for the paraphrase as a means of interpretation. "A translation is inadequate, a commentary is dry, and hard work, but a paraphrase is a commentary come alive, a commentary in flesh and blood." Its principal defect, especially when in the Pauline Epistles the language requires so much expansion, is that the Apostle is made to sound garrulous. "Accordingly, I want you to grow in love more and more, and that not casually as men who spill their affection at random, but with the directed insight of instructed appreciation, with the discernment of the highest Christian culture"; there is a certain sense of incongruity, which may at any moment pass over into irritation, about such words on the lips of St Paul. The paraphrast, like the anthologist, invites criticism on every page, and almost without noticing it the reader may find himself becoming more interested in the personality of the paraphrast than in the meaning of the text. But, as Dr Carpenter himself admits, the paraphrase "is not a spoon-feed which will save us the trouble of making an independent study"; the good commentary is indispensable.

CHRISTOPHER EVANS.

LINCOLN.

GOD, MAN AND THE ABSOLUTE: A STUDY OF THE BEARING OF PHILOSOPHY ON CHRISTIAN THEISM. By F. H. Cleobury. Hutchinson. 15s.

This book is an expansion of a thesis presented for the London D.Phil. It is a clear, able and interesting restatement and defence of that metaphysic variously described as Absolutist, Monistic, Objective, neo-Hegelian (and, of course, "Oxford") Idealism. It is therefore a challenge both to accepted contemporary philosophies and to anti-liberal theologies, and should be conscientiously read as such. Nearly half the book is taken up with a discussion of the epistemological bas-

of Absolutism and an exposition of the Idealist logic of identity-in-difference. Chapters follow on ethics, human freedom, error and finitude. Only the last twelve pages explicitly deal with traditional Christian theism.

If any object that all this epistemology (*i.e.*, analysis of the relation of our ideas to reality beyond ourselves) is the concern of philosophers, not theologians, we may reply that unless we assume some sort of "platform," or epistemological frame of reference, we cannot talk theology at all, but only pious nonsense. As Dr Cleobury points out (p. 55), most discussions of God's immanence and transcendence use a spatial analogy in a way which presupposes a particular (and, on an Idealist view, unsound) epistemology.

The fundamentals of Absolutist Idealism, on which Dr Cleobury rigorously and trenchantly constructs his Idealist ethics and reinterprets the propositions of traditional theism, can be set forth thus:

(1) We cannot "get behind" actual or possible experience. Truth is therefore neither a quality of propositions, nor a "correspondence with reality," but a coherence with the whole of experience.

(2) We cannot allow finality to any analysis of experience into mind and data. Ultimately all distinction between subject and object, and between subject and subject, must be transcended, though not annihilated, in the Absolute.

(3) Reason demands that the Real must be a systematic unity, self-consistent and self-grounded. Reality is the single totality of all experience.

In respect of these three foundations some searching questions have to be faced and answered. There is first the stock philosophical objection that, although we may admit an inescapable interpretative element in every perceptual judgment, perceptive activity seems to give us greater certainty, or new knowledge, by a process we recognize as distinct from the process of inference. There seems to be a distinct meaning to be given to the phrase "verification by sense-experience" of which Idealist epistemology can give no account, except at the cost of abandoning (1) above. The author only faces this objection at the end of his book (pp. 131-5), having assumed the premiss from the beginning.

Then Absolutism holds that there is a distinction between us and God only in terms of the inadequacy of our experience in this life. Nothing ultimate is conveyed by the distinction Finite-Infinite, Creator-Created. I am part of God; *all* my experience is part of His experience. In judgments of truth, and in right conduct, I am identical with the Divine (*vide* pp. 104, 143). What about my error or my sin? According to Dr Cleobury, God experiences me-having-an-erroneous-experience, me-sinning. So we can say that *in this context* my error is part of the truth, my sin is in God. But it is one thing to say that God has my toothache, and quite another to say that God experiences me-having-toothache. In that case "my toothache" is left hanging about the Idealistic universe unexperienced by God. If the Idealist is to avoid describing my errors and moral lapses as experiences of God *simpliciter*, he must ultimately explain that they are merely illusory and irrational, a falling short of the judgment and actions of the fully real and fully rational Absolute. They are consequent upon

our finitude, which we transcend whenever we speak truly and act rightly, and so have actual identity with God.

This particular metaphysical bottle cannot contain the wine of authentic N.T. Christianity. For the Gospel presupposes that God is not just a metaphysical postulation to make possible a rational analysis of the universe: but that He is qualitatively Other, a God to be worshipped, and therefore in some sense discontinuous with all that is finite, including men. The Gospel also indicates a disorder of the universe and a corruption of men which only a unique act by the Creator can deal with. Absolute Idealism, in its analysis of sin, denies the reality of the problem to which the Atonement (as understood by the N.T.) is the costly answer of God Himself.

Dr Cleobury is a very honest rationalist. He is convinced that "Rational Idealism is the only alternative to a scepticism which must include in its deadly grip ethical as well as metaphysical judgments" (p. 68). His book is worth reading, because for the orthodox Christian it emphasizes *by its failure* the paradox of man's intellectual capacity combined with intellectual insecurity and darkness. "The reason which asks the question whether the God of religious faith is plausible has already implied a negative answer in the question, because it has made itself God, and naturally cannot tolerate another" (Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, I, p. 177).

Basil S. Moss.

Scholæ Cancellarii,
Lincoln.

Luther Speaks. Lutterworth Press. 8s. 6d.

This book contains a series of essays for the fourth centenary o Luther's death, written by a group of Lutheran ministers at that time in Britain. It disclaims any apologetic or polemical purpose and seeks to "let Luther speak for himself."

British Christians in general are woefully ignorant about Luther and the churches that are named after him; and if for no other reason this volume must be welcomed as providing some sort of introduction to Lutheranism for the ministers of churches in Britain: ministers because the book is too theological in its emphasis to be very en lightening to laymen. It will serve another purpose in rectifying certain preconceptions about Luther and Lutheranism that ar prevalent here and elsewhere, such as the idea that Luther's teaching inevitably leads to the Church's pusillanimous surrender to the State

Half the book purports to let Luther speak for himself. One chapte gives us "Comfortable Words of Luther" and another extracts fron his letters. The rest of this half consists of essays by various Lutheran on some aspect of their master's teaching in prayer, public worship preaching, teaching, the eucharist and theology in general. There i much useful and enlightening material here, and the nature of Luther' contribution to the reformed theology of worship and the sacrament is clearly brought out.

The second half of the book seeks to show how Luther still speaks There are essays on the Lutheran Church in Germany, the Luthera

reformation in Scandinavia, on the "Inner" and "Foreign" Missions, on the Lund School of Theology and on the Bible in Germany. Again, these are all informative essays, which will serve as an admirable introduction to contemporary Lutheranism in the north of Europe. Yet, as the writers are doubtless aware, that small part of the world, though so typically Lutheran, by no means exhausts Lutheranism, which is also strong and effective in the United States. But again, for the average minister, apt to think of Lutheranism as a peculiarly German phenomenon, these essays will be a most valuable corrective.

I welcome the book, therefore, for its power to enlighten the darkness of our minds about Lutheranism. But I would have liked to ask two things of the authors and publishers in their planning and production of the work. First, that each writer should have been given more space to develop his theme: it seems to me impossible to give a fair and balanced account of the many-sided, paradoxical, even contradictory thought of Luther in the few words available. The writers have triumphed well here. Second, that the English style should be improved. The authors have clearly done their best, but could not the publishers have given us a more stylish volume to read?

For ministers here the high lights of the book are the chapters on worship—preaching, prayer, eucharist. Luther has much to say to us on these matters; and the authors have enabled us now to see the clear grasp Luther had of the nature and function of Word and Sacrament. Finally, let me add that in an impressive foreword by the Bishop Berrgrav of Oslo I learnt how Luther, so long blamed for ecclesiastical subservience to the State in Germany, could become in Sweden the inspiration of ecclesiastical and national resistance to Hitlerism and all its devilry. The lesson might be timely for us all still.

JOHN MARSH.

MANSFIELD COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

MIRACLES. A Preliminary Study. By C. S. Lewis. Geoffrey Bles. 10s. 6d.

In the eighteenth section of the *De Incarnatione* St Athanasius states the traditional Christian conviction that Christ's miracles proved His Godhead.

"He cleansed the lepers, He made the lame to walk, He opened the ears of the deaf and the eyes of the blind, there was no sickness or weakness that He did not drive away. Even the most casual observer can see that these were acts of God. . . . He formed His own body from the virgin; and that is no small proof of His Godhead, since He who made that was the Maker of all else." For many centuries this argument was a commonplace of Christian theology. St Augustine observes that he would not have been a Christian without the miracles. Pascal is even more pointed: "On n'aurait point péché en ne croyant pas Jésus-Christ, sans les miracles." Bishop Butler

considered the proof from miracles to be one of the two direct and fundamental proofs of the truth of Christianity.

Contemporary Christian writers do not often follow this bold line. And their hesitation is not entirely due to the effects of historical criticism. After all, Bishop Butler was quite familiar with the kind of critic who doubted the historical worth of the records of miracles in the New Testament. His counter-attack is still well worth reading. But Butler could assume, as a modern writer cannot, that all his readers acknowledged an Author of Nature. Nowadays a man who wants to write about miracles is held up at the outset by the conviction that his readers may not share this belief. And so his book tends to become a treatise on theism. This is what has happened to Dr Lewis. The philosophical attack on unbelief comes first. Miracles appear in three chapters at the end of the book. Taken as a whole, the book is designed to help the reader to acknowledge the possibility of miracles before he approaches the study of the New Testament records.

The convictions of the naturalist are first sorted out and their self-contradiction clearly exposed. The facts of human Reason and Conscience are summoned, in the good old way of Christian Platonism, as witnesses to the operation of something beyond Nature in the natural order. The frontier situation between Reason and Nature is carefully studied. The concept of natural law is examined and shown not to exclude the possibility of miracles. And for those whose brains are, at the best, numb instruments for handling metaphorical language there is an admirable chapter on symbolism.

The Christian miracles form the theme of the last three chapters. The first of these is devoted to the Incarnation, the Grand Miracle. In the second the author discusses the miracles of the old creation, in which a change normally accomplished by God in the course of nature is compressed into a short time. Each year, as Augustine pointed out to the people of Hippo, God changes water into wine by means of the vine. Once, at Cana in Galilee, the Son of God did the same thing but dispensed with the usual means. The third chapter deals with the miracles of the new creation, in which natural processes are not speeded up but reversed. The raising of Lazarus, Christ walking on the water, the Resurrection and the Ascension, are hints of what the New Nature will be like after redemption. Throughout these last chapters the approach to the Christian miracles is like that of Athanasius. They are shown to be similar to the works of God in Nature. Miracles are not arbitrary violations of natural law. They are special actions of a character which we might expect from the Author of Nature.

Perhaps his broad handling of the doctrine of the New Nature—in the old language, the life of the world to come—is among Dr Lewis's most valuable contributions to modern theology. He feels the force of the Christian teaching about the resurrection of the body, and his gifts of poetry and imagination, though used as he is well aware in a dangerous field, enable him to express the joyful hope of the transformation of Nature, which perhaps many feel but of which few can

speak sense. For him the resurrection of Nature is guaranteed by the Incarnation.

"The union between God and Nature in Christ admits of no divorce. He will not go out of Nature again and she must be glorified in all ways which this miraculous union demands. When spring comes it leaves no corner of the land untouched'."

The style in which this book is written is as clear and vigorous as Dr Lewis's earlier writings would lead one to expect. One of Pascal's contemporaries quaintly says that the author of the Provincial Letters vexed the Jesuits by writing theology which even women could read. Dr Lewis performs a similar service for English theology. He makes it readable. The rather rare combination of the gifts of poet, philosopher and theologian is quite irresistible.

A. C. Scupholme.

Ugthorpe.

The Holy Communion. A Symposium by David Cairns, G. Ronald Howe, S. C. Neill, E. G. Rupp, E. C. Ratcliff, Gerald Vann, F. Townley Lord. Edited by Hugh Martin. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

In this admirable little book, representatives of the main lines of Christian tradition in this country give an account of the views and practices which prevail in their respective Churches with respect to the Holy Communion, and of the place which it holds in the faith and life of these Churches. Some surprise will naturally be felt at the inclusion of a chapter by a representative of the Society of Friends, who however is fully alive to the fact that "it is incumbent upon us to examine the purposes for which, throughout the Christian Church, that sacrament is, in fact, outwardly observed, and to satisfy ourselves that its 'inward' observance in the Friends' Meeting for Worship does in fact fulfil those purposes." Since the purpose of the writers is not controversial but explanatory, criticisms of the various positions set forth would be out of place in a review. What, however, does become clear is that while there is, speaking generally, a growing measure of agreement about the Holy Communion in its sacramental significance, the divergences become acute and apparently irreconcilable with regard to its sacrificial aspects. In this connexion we heartily endorse the words of Bishop Neill, who, writing from the Anglican side, and contrasting the views of Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics, says, "the first requisite is a more careful and accurate statement of doctrine, as it is understood by both parties; the differences cannot be reconciled until there is a perfectly clear definition of the points at which the differences come in." Lack of "this perfectly clear definition" involves the Eucharistic theology of all schools, not even excepting the Roman, in a kind of haze. For example, what is the precise meaning of the word "representation" as applied to the idea of sacrifice in the Holy Communion? And what exactly is meant by the statement that the Mass is "identical" with the sacrifice on Calvary? Fr Vann's explanation, lucid as he endeavours to make it, leaves certain fundamental questions unanswered, and chiefly this: how can a bearing of Divine judgment, which is surely the vital element in the atoning sacrifice of

Christ, be prolonged, or represented, or mystically conveyed b means of a symbolic and ceremonial act? It would appear that th word "identity," definite as it seems, is not free from ambiguit Again, Mr Gordon Rupp, writing from the Methodist side, quot from John Wesley's hymns lines which speak of "offering up th precious bleeding sacrifice," of "offering up the spotless Lamb." can hardly be believed that Wesley, sacramentalist as he was, seriousl intended to imply a view of the Holy Communion scarcely distinguish able from the Roman Mass.

There are many separate points of interest in this book. It is rath startling to be told by Professor Ratcliff, who contributes a scholarl article on the beginnings and early development of the Holy Com munion, that "the doctrine of transubstantiation may fairly b described as the term of a movement of thought starting fro John VI." Again, an Anglican may well ponder over Bishop Neill reflection: "Until 1914 in the majority of Anglican Churches, Hol Communion after Mattins on the first Sunday in the month was *th* Parish Eucharist; numbers of communicants were large, and the was a real sense of community among those who met month by mont at the Table of the Lord . . . it can hardly be doubted that th almost complete disappearance of that one unifying service ha removed a powerful element of corporate Christian life . . ."

This is indeed a beautiful and helpful little book and should mak a wide appeal.

F. W. Camfield.

Kingsbridge.

The Byzantine Patriarchate. By George Every, S.S.M. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

The contention in the preface of this book that "The Christian Ea disappears from the field of vision of most English students . . . aft the reign of Justinian" is only too true, and this contribution to th bookshelf to help fill the gap is welcome. The reintegration of divide Christendom—a much deeper and truer aim than the reunion churches by constitutional agreement—is a slow process and calls fo much patient and painstaking work. In particular, the impact the Eastern presentation of Christianity upon English Christians not inconsiderable and is of immense importance. The Englis Church is thinking out afresh much of its inherited practice in face the contemporary situation, and in thinking back to origins and fir principles the distinctive standpoint of the Eastern Church must b fully and knowledgeably taken into account. Not least, an accura knowledge of Eastern Christian history needs to be more wide diffused. This is Brother George Every's first avowed object in writin this book, and his evident enthusiasm will promote its fulfilment. Th enthusiasm is most engaging in the chapters which deal with an "Iconodulia" and "Iconoclasm," which he has supported with eig photographs (the first of which is not very helpful). The greater part the period he is dealing with is bewildering in its interwoven textu of parties and personalities contending with or supporting one anoth

n ever-changing patterns. The colour of their theological or ecclesistical differences often presents itself as purely relative—red appears lmost blue when seen from a different point of vantage! Not even George Every can present this piece of history as holiday reading or the general reader: it rightly demands the close attention of the tudent. We must then ask whether the book does not fall between wo stools. Does it avoid the over-generalizations and over-simplifications to which attempts to popularize the knowledge of the hitherto nknown are prone, and which in particular much popular interest n the Orthodox Church seems only too ready to wield in a dangerous manner? (P. 196: "The focus of Byzantine liturgical worship was the con of the ascended Christ in the cupola, rather than the sacramental lements upon the altar, or reserved in a tabernacle or a pyx. The Byzantines had never developed or defined a difference in kind etween Christ's presence in body and blood at the eucharist and the resence of Christ and of the Holy Ghost in the water of baptism, nd in the oil of unction, confirmation and ordination." This quotaion, to take an example, contains two statements which call for a reat deal of caution on the part of the reader.) On the other hand, he references, though generally full, are uneven, and the expert may ind gaps in them in places. In a popular statement of established facts r theories the larger standard works are sufficient authority, but this ook goes deeper at times, and unevenly, while the author explicitly laims to be putting forward an original and unestablished point of iew in the last chapters. Such a theory needs to be presented in full panoply to challenge the experts. Is it wise first to incorporate it in a book like this intended to introduce the general student to a new eriod? To do this is sometimes dangerous. Many would claim, for nstance, a recent work of great popularity and great size to be nothing ess than a menace in seeking to popularize new theories before they ave been sufficiently tested by the cut-and-thrust of the experts. heories which may touch deeply the relations between the sundered arts of Christendom in their past origins or their present practices eed especially to undergo the stern discipline of the patient scholar o try out the truth in them. But perhaps this is taking too far-reaching a view of the impact of this pleasantly produced and attractively written book on the general reader. There is ample need to provoke many to take an interest in the divergence of Eastern and Western Christendom, if they may thereby be provoked to take a corresponding nterest in its reintegration.

MARTIN PIERCE.

MEPPERSHALL.

SHORTER NOTICES

The Nutshell. By Walter Roberts. Distributed by Matson's Publications, St Ives, Hunts. 2s. 6d.

"Scorn the Critic, Sonnets," Mr Roberts says, and with their key unlocks his heart for the readers whom he calls his peers. Yet to judge by the scraps of eulogy from fellow-poets who are also critics, reprinted

by him on the back cover of his booklet, the Critic has not served him so ill in the past, and there seems no reason why he should on this occasion. Mr Roberts may not be a Byron at burlesque, but he knows more than Byron about the Christian faith. In this poem compounded of 101 sonnets he outdoes in variation of rhyme sequence Petrarch, Shakespeare and Milton combined, and indeed can inflict monotony on no reader. If he has an easy mark in "English culture's crass futility" and other Aunt Sallies at which he wittily shies with his *Nutshell*, this mingles wisdom with merriment, and many an advertised library novel is tedious by comparison.

M. B.

PETERBOROUGH.

Unto a Full-grown Man. Vol. VI. The Word of God. By E. R. Wickham. S.P.C.K. 3s.

The latest arrival in this series deals with the nature of the Bible and its place in the life of the Church, and then works through a selection of biblical themes (the Law, Sacrifice, Man, and the Holy Community). Generally speaking, it is a sound presentation of the present position in biblical scholarship and of the Anglican position. It is especially cheering to read (p. 37): "This doctrine of justification, salvation, *through faith alone* in Jesus Christ, is the great evangelical confession. It is the great Protestant battle-cry. . . . It is the keystone of our Reformed English Church."

It is to be hoped, however, that the clergy will not follow Canon Lumb's deplorable suggestion that in this series "the busy parish priest will find ready-made material for courses of Lenten sermons or instruction." Have the parochial clergy sunk to the level of theological tin-openers? If they have, let them at least beware of feeding their people with the meat as it comes straight out of the tin. Let them cook it properly first, or, to drop the metaphor, let their proclamation be not only theologically correct (which this book will help them to ensure), but let it speak to their people where they are (which this book cannot by the nature of things do for them). One final word. Why is this Volume VI? Should it not have been Volume I? How can we speak of "God the Father, God the Son," "God the Holy Spirit," "Common Prayer," "The Christian Life," "Church History," until we have settled the preliminary question of our ultimate authority for the truth? The planners of this series seem to have regarded the Bible as a kind of accessory to the Christian life, a source of nourishment for individual piety. But Mr Wickham obviously thinks the Bible is more than that: for him it is, if not the fountain, at least the criterion of the Church's proclamation. "The old tenet—'the Church to teach, the Bible to prove' (*i.e.*, to test)—sums up the theory of the Church of England as well as that of the apostolic undivided Church."

R. H. FULLER.

EDGBASTON.

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